| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w7072 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 7072 |
| Volatile Policy and Private Information: The Case of Monetary Policy | |
| Larry E. Jones; Rodolfo E. Manuelli | |
| 发表日期 | 1999-04-01 |
| 出版年 | 1999 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this paper we study how volatility in monetary policy affects economic performance in the presence of endogenously chosen information structures. To isolate the effects produced by the interaction of uncertainty in monetary policy and (possibly) asymmetric information, we consider a model in which in the absence of either one of these features the equilibrium would be efficient. The equilibria that we find, with volatility and asymmetry of information, are inefficient for two reasons: first, in some cases, economic agents fail to trade, even though it is always efficient to do so; second, to capture the rents associated with being informed, agents spend resources acquiring socially useless information. Thus, in addition to the more standard effects of volatile inflation, our model calls attention to two types of costs associated with monetary uncertainty: the cost of not trading, and the cost of allocating resources to wasteful activities. The model implies that if monetary policy is not volatile all agents are symmetrically informed and hence, the outcome is efficient. Alternatively, making policy transparent,' i.e guaranteeing that all agents share the same information, serves the same purpose. |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w7072 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/564598 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Larry E. Jones,Rodolfo E. Manuelli. Volatile Policy and Private Information: The Case of Monetary Policy. 1999. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w7072.pdf（338KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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