| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w7085
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 7085
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| Hostility in Takeovers: In the Eyes of the Beholder? |
| G. William Schwert
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| 发表日期 | 1999-04-01
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| 出版年 | 1999
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | This paper examines whether hostile takeovers can be distinguished from friendly takeovers, empirically, based on accounting and stock performance data. Much has been made of this distinction in both the popular and the academic literature, where gains from hostile takeovers are typically attributed to the value of replacing incumbent managers and the gains from friendly takeovers are typically attributed to strategic synergies. Alternatively, hostility could reflect just a perceptual distinction arising from different patterns of public disclosure, where negotiated outcomes are the rule and transactions tend to be characterized as friendly when bargaining remains undisclosed throughout, and hostile when the public becomes aware of the negotiation before its resolution. Empirical tests show that most deals described as hostile in the press are not distinguishable from friendly deals in economic terms, and that negotiations are publicized earlier in hostile transactions. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics
; Corporate Finance
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| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w7085
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/564611
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
G. William Schwert. Hostility in Takeovers: In the Eyes of the Beholder?. 1999.
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文件名：
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w7085.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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