全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Incentives to Settle Under Joint and Several Liability

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w7096
来源ID	Working Paper 7096
	Incentives to Settle Under Joint and Several Liability
	Howard F. Chang; Hilary Sigman
发表日期	1999-04-01
出版年	1999
语种	英语
摘要	Congress may soon restrict joint and several liability for cleanup of contaminated sites under Superfund. We explore whether this change would discourage settlements and is therefore likely to increase the program's already high litigation costs. Recent theoretical research by Kornhauser and Revesz finds that joint and several liability may either encourage or discourage settlement, depending upon the correlation of outcomes at trial across defendants. We extend their two-defendant model to a richer framework with N defendants. This extension allows us to test the theoretical model empirically using data on Superfund litigation. We find that joint and several liability does not discourage settlements and may even encourage them. Our results support the model's predictions about the effects of several variables, such as the degree of correlation in trial outcomes.
主题	Other ; Law and Economics ; Environmental and Resource Economics ; Renewable Resources
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w7096
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/564620
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Howard F. Chang,Hilary Sigman. Incentives to Settle Under Joint and Several Liability. 1999.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w7096.pdf（281KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览