| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/t0239 |
| 来源ID | Technical Working Paper 0239 |
| Toll Competition Among Congested Roads | |
| Eduardo Engel; Ronald Fischer; Alexander Galetovic | |
| 发表日期 | 1999-05-01 |
| 出版年 | 1999 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A growing number of roads are currently financed by the private sector via Build-Operate-and -Transfer (BOT) schemes. When the franchised road has no close substitute, the government must regulate tolls. Yet when there are many ways of getting from one point to another, regulation may be avoided by allowing competition between several franchise owners. This paper studies toll competition among private roads with congestion. The paper derives two main results. First, we find sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies with strictly positive tolls. Equilibrium congestion is less than optimal, which runs counter to what is expected form price competition. While a lower toll reduces the out-of-pocket cost paid by a user, it increases the congestion cost thereby reducing the drivers' willingness to pay for using the road. Franchise holders partially internalize congestion costs when setting tolls, which softens price competition. Second, when demand and the number of roads increase at the same rate, tolls converge to the socially optimal level -- that is, in the limit equilibrium tolls are just enough to make each driver internalize the congestion externality. |
| 主题 | Regional and Urban Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/t0239 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/564630 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Eduardo Engel,Ronald Fischer,Alexander Galetovic. Toll Competition Among Congested Roads. 1999. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| t0239.pdf（285KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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