| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w7110
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 7110
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| Government as a Discriminating Monopolist in the Financial Market: The Case of China |
| Roger H. Gordon; Wei Li
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| 发表日期 | 1999-05-01
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| 出版年 | 1999
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | To date, China has maintained a variety of restrictions on its financial markets. In addition to imposing capital controls and regulating interest rates, the government controls both the set of firms that can sell equity on the domestic or foreign stock markets, and the amount they can sell. China is unique in that foreigners pay much less than domestic investors for intrinsically identical shares. In this paper, we show that these characteristics of the Chinese financial market are consistent with a government choosing regulations to maximize a standard type of social welfare function. The observed policy of charging much higher prices for equity sold to domestic than to foreign investors can simply reflect the more inelastic demand for equity by domestic investors. Under certain conditions, these regulations are equivalent to income taxes on business and interest income. The pattern of tax rates is not qualitatively different from those commonly observed elsewhere, particularly in other countries with capital controls. Given the ease with which firms and individuals can evade income taxes, however, indirect taxation through restrictions on the financial market may serve as an effective alternative. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics
; Financial Institutions
; Public Economics
; Taxation
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| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w7110
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/564638
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Roger H. Gordon,Wei Li. Government as a Discriminating Monopolist in the Financial Market: The Case of China. 1999.
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文件名：
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w7110.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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