| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w7152
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 7152
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| The Equilibrium Degree of Transparency and Control in Monetary Policy |
| Jon Faust; Lars E.O. Svensson
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| 发表日期 | 1999-06-01
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| 出版年 | 1999
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | We examine a central bank's endogenous choice of degree of control and degree of transparency, under both commitment and discretion. Under commitment, we find that the deliberate choice of sloppy control is far less likely under a standard central-bank loss function than reported for a less standard loss function by Cukierman and Meltzer. Under discretion, maximum degree of control is the only equilibrium. With regard to the degree of transparency, under commitment, a sufficiently patient bank with sufficiently low average inflation bias will always choose minimum transparency. Under discretion, both minimum and maximum transparency are equilibria. We argue that discretion is the more realistic assumption for the choice of control and that commitment is more realistic for the choice of transparency. A maximum feasible degree of control with a minimum degree of transparency is then a likely outcome. The Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve System are, arguably, examples of this outcome. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics
; Monetary Policy
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| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w7152
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/564687
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Jon Faust,Lars E.O. Svensson. The Equilibrium Degree of Transparency and Control in Monetary Policy. 1999.
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文件名：
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w7152.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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