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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w7152
来源IDWorking Paper 7152
The Equilibrium Degree of Transparency and Control in Monetary Policy
Jon Faust; Lars E.O. Svensson
发表日期1999-06-01
出版年1999
语种英语
摘要We examine a central bank's endogenous choice of degree of control and degree of transparency, under both commitment and discretion. Under commitment, we find that the deliberate choice of sloppy control is far less likely under a standard central-bank loss function than reported for a less standard loss function by Cukierman and Meltzer. Under discretion, maximum degree of control is the only equilibrium. With regard to the degree of transparency, under commitment, a sufficiently patient bank with sufficiently low average inflation bias will always choose minimum transparency. Under discretion, both minimum and maximum transparency are equilibria. We argue that discretion is the more realistic assumption for the choice of control and that commitment is more realistic for the choice of transparency. A maximum feasible degree of control with a minimum degree of transparency is then a likely outcome. The Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve System are, arguably, examples of this outcome.
主题Macroeconomics ; Monetary Policy
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w7152
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/564687
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GB/T 7714
Jon Faust,Lars E.O. Svensson. The Equilibrium Degree of Transparency and Control in Monetary Policy. 1999.
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