| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w7158 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 7158 |
| Conflicts and Common Interests in Committees | |
| Hao Li; Sherwin Rosen; Wing Suen | |
| 发表日期 | 1999-06-01 |
| 出版年 | 1999 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Committees improve decisions by pooling independent information of members, but promote manipulation, obfuscation, and exaggeration of private evidence when members have conflicting preferences. We study how self-interest mediates these conflicting forces. When members' preferences differ, no person ever submits a report that allows perfect inference of his private information. Instead, equilibrium strategies are many-to-one mappings that transform continuous data into ordered ranks: voting procedures are the equilibrium methods of achieving a consensus in committees. Voting necessarily coarsens the transmission of information among members, but is necessary to control conflicts of interest. The degree of coarseness of the equilibrium voting procedure is determined by the extent of conflicting preferences. Though self-interests necessarily reduce the efficient use of information in committees, real information sharing occurs nonetheless. Committees make better decisions on behalf of the average' (Pareto weighted) member than would any individual on the basis of own information. Committees are viable, though imperfect ways of making decisions when information is dispersed among members. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Labor Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w7158 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/564693 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hao Li,Sherwin Rosen,Wing Suen. Conflicts and Common Interests in Committees. 1999. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w7158.pdf（375KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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