| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
|
| DOI | 10.3386/w7165
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 7165
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| Sticky Prices, Coordination and Collusion |
| John C. Driscoll; Harumi Ito
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| 发表日期 | 1999-06-01
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| 出版年 | 1999
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | New Keynesian models of price setting under monopolistic competition involve two kinds of inefficiency: the price level is too high because firms ignore an aggregate demand externality, and when there are costs of changing prices, price stickiness may be an equilibrium response to changes in nominal money even when all agents would be better off if all adjusted prices. This paper models the consequences of allowing firms to coordinate, enforcing the coordination by punishing deviators; this is equivalent to modeling firms as an implicit cartel playing a punishment game. We show that coordination can partially or fully eliminate the first kind of inefficiency, depending on the magnitude of the punishment, but cannot always remove the second. The response of prices to a monetary shock will depend on the magnitude of the punishment, and may be asymmetric. Implications for the welfare cost of fluctuations also differ from the standard monopolistic competition case. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics
; Market Structure and Distribution
; Macroeconomics
; Macroeconomic Models
|
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w7165
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/564700
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
John C. Driscoll,Harumi Ito. Sticky Prices, Coordination and Collusion. 1999.
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文件名：
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w7165.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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