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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w7165
来源IDWorking Paper 7165
Sticky Prices, Coordination and Collusion
John C. Driscoll; Harumi Ito
发表日期1999-06-01
出版年1999
语种英语
摘要New Keynesian models of price setting under monopolistic competition involve two kinds of inefficiency: the price level is too high because firms ignore an aggregate demand externality, and when there are costs of changing prices, price stickiness may be an equilibrium response to changes in nominal money even when all agents would be better off if all adjusted prices. This paper models the consequences of allowing firms to coordinate, enforcing the coordination by punishing deviators; this is equivalent to modeling firms as an implicit cartel playing a punishment game. We show that coordination can partially or fully eliminate the first kind of inefficiency, depending on the magnitude of the punishment, but cannot always remove the second. The response of prices to a monetary shock will depend on the magnitude of the punishment, and may be asymmetric. Implications for the welfare cost of fluctuations also differ from the standard monopolistic competition case.
主题Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Macroeconomics ; Macroeconomic Models
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w7165
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/564700
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John C. Driscoll,Harumi Ito. Sticky Prices, Coordination and Collusion. 1999.
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