| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w7335 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 7335 |
| Empire-Builders and Shirkers: Investment, Firm Performance, and Managerial Incentives | |
| Rajesh K. Aggarwal; Andrew A. Samwick | |
| 发表日期 | 1999-09-01 |
| 出版年 | 1999 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Do firms systematically over- or underinvest as a result of agency problems? We develop a contracting model between shareholders and managers in which managers have private benefits or private costs of investment. Managers overinvest when they have private benefits and underinvest when they have private costs. Optimal incentive contracts mitigate the over- or underinvestment problem. We derive comparative static predictions for the equilibrium relationships between incentives from compensation, investment, and firm performance for both cases. The relationship between firm performance and managerial incentives, in isolation, is insufficient to identify whether managers have private benefits or private costs of investment. In order to identify whether managers have private benefits or costs, we estimate the joint relationships between incentives and firm performance and between incentives and investment. Our empirical results show that both firm performance and investment are increasing in managerial incentives. These results are consistent with managers having private costs of investment. We find no support for overinvestment based on private benefits. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w7335 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/564873 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Rajesh K. Aggarwal,Andrew A. Samwick. Empire-Builders and Shirkers: Investment, Firm Performance, and Managerial Incentives. 1999. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w7335.pdf（393KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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