| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w7342 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 7342 |
| Congressional Vote Options | |
| David C. King; Richard J. Zeckhauser | |
| 发表日期 | 1999-09-01 |
| 出版年 | 1999 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Among political practitioners, there is conventional wisdom about the outcomes of critical and salient legislative votes. 'This vote,' we hear, ' will either win by a little or lose by a lot.' Real-world examples suggest coalition leaders purchase 'hip-pocket' votes and "if you need me" pledges, which are converted to favorable votes when they will yield a victory. When the outcome is uncertain, such a process -- securing commitments in advance and calling them in if necessary -- is advantageous relative to traditional vote buying. Excess votes are not bought, nor are votes purchased for a losing effort. In effect, the leader secures options on votes. Given uncertainty, buying vote options yields two outcomes in conceivably winnable situations, one a narrow victory, the other a substantial loss. Such a distribution of outcomes is not explicable in a traditional vote-buying framework. We look for evidence of this pattern -- the tracings of 'if you need me pledges' -- by examining all Congressional Quarterly key votes from 1975 through 1998. On these critical and salient votes, narrow victories are much more frequent than narrow losses. Furthermore, when leaders lose key votes, as predicted, they lose by bigger margins than when they win. Finally, we discuss leadership strategies for keeping 'narrow wins' from unraveling into 'big losses.' |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Welfare and Collective Choice |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w7342 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/564880 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | David C. King,Richard J. Zeckhauser. Congressional Vote Options. 1999. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w7342.pdf（234KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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