| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w7428 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 7428 |
| Investor Protection: Origins, Consequences, and Reform | |
| Rafael La Porta; Florencio Lopez-deSilanes; Andrei Shleifer; Robert W. Vishny | |
| 发表日期 | 1999-12-01 |
| 出版年 | 1999 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Recent research has documented large differences between countries in ownership concentration in publicly traded firms, in the breadth and depth of capital markets, in dividend policies, and in the access of firms to external finance. We suggest that there is a common element to the explanations of these differences, namely how well investors, both shareholders and creditors, are protected by law from expropriation by the managers and controlling shareholders of firms. We describe the differences in laws and the effectiveness of their enforcement across countries, discuss the possible origins of these differences, summarize their consequences, and assess potential strategies of corporate governance reform. We argue that the legal approach is a more fruitful way to understand corporate governance and its reform than the conventional distinction between bank-centered and market-centered financial systems. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w7428 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/564969 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Rafael La Porta,Florencio Lopez-deSilanes,Andrei Shleifer,et al. Investor Protection: Origins, Consequences, and Reform. 1999. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w7428.pdf（84KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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