| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w7470 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 7470 |
| The Role of Commitment in Dynamic Contracts: Evidence from Life Insurance | |
| Igal Hendel; Alessandro Lizzeri | |
| 发表日期 | 2000 |
| 出版年 | 2000 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We look at the life insurance industry to study the properties of long term contracts in a world where consumers cannot commit to a contract. The main issue is how contracts are designed to deal with classification risk. We present a model that captures the main features of this industry. The data is especially suited for a test of the theory since it includes information on the entire profile of future premiums. The lack of commitment by consumers shapes contracts in the way predicted by the theory. All types of contracts involve front-loading. This generates a partial lock-in of consumers. Contracts that are more front-loaded have a lower present value of premiums over the period of coverage. This is consistent with the idea that more front-loaded contracts retain better risk pools. The estimates suggest that classification risk is almost completely insured by long term level-premium contracts. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w7470 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/565016 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Igal Hendel,Alessandro Lizzeri. The Role of Commitment in Dynamic Contracts: Evidence from Life Insurance. 2000. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w7470.pdf（375KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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