| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w7475 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 7475 |
| Does Political Ambiguity Pay? Corporate Campaign Contributions and the Rewards to Legislator Reputation | |
| Randall S. Kroszner; Thomas Stratmann | |
| 发表日期 | 2000 |
| 出版年 | 2000 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Do politicians tend to follow a strategy of ambiguity in their policy positions or a strategy of reputational development to reduce uncertainty about where they stand? Ambiguity could allow a legislator to avoid alienating constituents and to play rival interests off against each other to maximize campaign contributions. Alternatively, reputational clarity could help to reduce uncertainty about a candidate and lead to high campaign contributions from favored interests. We outline a theory that considers conditions under which a politician would and would not prefer reputational development and policy-stance clarity in the context of repeat dealing with special interests. Our proxy for reputational development is the percent of repeat givers to a legislator. Using data on corporate political action committee contributions (PACs) to members of the U.S. House during the seven electoral cycles from 1983/84 to 1995/96, we find that legislators do not appear to follow a strategy of ambiguity and that high reputational development is rewarded with high PAC contributions. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w7475 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/565021 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Randall S. Kroszner,Thomas Stratmann. Does Political Ambiguity Pay? Corporate Campaign Contributions and the Rewards to Legislator Reputation. 2000. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w7475.pdf（213KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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