全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Elected versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w7579
来源ID	Working Paper 7579
	Elected versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence
	Stephen Coate; Timothy Besley
发表日期	2000-03-01
出版年	2000
语种	英语
摘要	This paper contrasts direct election with political appointment of regulators. When regulators are appointed, regulatory policy becomes bundled with other policy issues the appointing politicians are responsible for. Since regulatory issues are not salient for most voters, regulatory policy outcomes reflect the preferences of party elites and special interests. Direct election of regulators strengthens the power of voters by ensuring the salience of regulatory issues. Using panel data on regulatory outcomes from U.S. states, we find evidence in favor of the idea that elected states are more pro-consumer in their regulatory policies.
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w7579
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/565132
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Stephen Coate,Timothy Besley. Elected versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence. 2000.