| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w6919 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 6919 |
| Managerial Value Diversion and Shareholder Wealth | |
| Lucian Arye Bebchuk; Christine Jolls | |
| 发表日期 | 2000-04-01 |
| 出版年 | 2000 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The agents to whom shareholders delegate the management of corporate affairs may transfer value from shareholders to themselves through a variety of mechanisms, such as self-dealing, insider trading, and taking of corporate opportunities. A common view in the law and economics literature is that such value diversion does not ultimately produce a reduction in shareholder wealth, since value diversion simply substitutes for alternative forms of compensation that would otherwise be paid to managers. We question this view within its own analytical framework by studying, in a principal-agent model, the effects of allowing value diversion on managerial compensation and effort. We suggest that the standard law and economics view of value diversion overlooks a significant cost of such behavior. Many common modes of compensation can provide managers with incentives to enhance shareholder value; replacing such compensation would reduce these incentives. As a result, even if the consequences of a rule permitting value diversion can be fully taken into account in settling managerial compensation, such a rule might still produce a reduction in shareholder wealth -- and would not do so only if value diversion would have some countervailing positive effects (a possibility which our model considers) that are sufficiently significant in size. |
| 主题 | Other ; Law and Economics ; Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w6919 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/565185 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Lucian Arye Bebchuk,Christine Jolls. Managerial Value Diversion and Shareholder Wealth. 2000. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w6919.pdf（824KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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