| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w6509 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 6509 |
| The Effect of Offer-of-Settlement Rules on the Terms of Settlement | |
| Lucian Arye Bebchuk; Howard F. Chang | |
| 发表日期 | 2000-05-01 |
| 出版年 | 2000 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Under an offer of settlement' rule, a party to a lawsuit may make a special offer to settle with the other party, such that if the other party rejects this offer, then this offer (unlike an ordinary offer) becomes part of the record in the case and may affect the allocation of litigation costs. Specifically, if the parties litigate to judgment, then the allocation of litigation costs may depend on how the judgment compares with the special offer. This paper develops a model of bargaining under offer-of-settlement rules that can be used to analyze the effect that such rules have on the terms of settlement. The analysis first sets forth a general principle that identifies the settlement amount under any such rule. We then apply this principle to derive the settlement terms under the most important of these rules, and we identify a large set of seemingly different rules that produce identical settlements. Our results have both positive and normative implications. |
| 主题 | Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w6509 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/565238 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Lucian Arye Bebchuk,Howard F. Chang. The Effect of Offer-of-Settlement Rules on the Terms of Settlement. 2000. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w6509.pdf（1689KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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