| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w7232 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 7232 |
| Federalism and Takeover Law: The Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers | |
| Lucian Arye Bebchuk; Allen Ferrell | |
| 发表日期 | 2000-06-01 |
| 出版年 | 2000 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper analyzes certain important shortcomings of state competition in corporate law. In particular, we show, with respect to takeovers, states have incentives to produce rules that excessively protect incumbent managers. The development of state takeover law, we argue, is consistent with our theory. States have adopted antitakeover statutes that have little policy basis, and, more importantly, they have provided managers with a wider and more open-ended latitude to engage in defensive tactics than endorsed even by the commentators most favorable to such tactics. Furthermore, states have elected, even though they could have done otherwise, to impose antitakeover protections on shareholders, who did not appear to favor them, in a way that left shareholders with little choice or say. Finally, we conclude by pointing out that proponents of state competition cannot reconcile their views with the evolution of state takeover law---and should therefore reconsider their unqualified support of state competition. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w7232 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/565294 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Lucian Arye Bebchuk,Allen Ferrell. Federalism and Takeover Law: The Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers. 2000. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w7232.pdf（229KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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