全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Last Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Theory and Evidence from a Natural Experiment on the Internet

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w7729
来源ID	Working Paper 7729
	Last Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Theory and Evidence from a Natural Experiment on the Internet
	Alvin E. Roth; Axel Ockenfels
发表日期	2000-06-01
出版年	2000
语种	英语
摘要	There is a great deal of late bidding on internet second price auctions. We show that this need not result from either common value properties of the objects being sold, or irrational behavior: late bidding can occur at equilibrium even in private value auctions. The reason is that very late bids have a positive probability of not being successfully submitted, and this opens a way for bidders to implicitly collude, and avoid bidding wars, in auctions such as those run by eBay, which have a fixed end time. A natural experiment is available because the auctions on Amazon, while operating under otherwise similar rules, do not have a fixed end time, but continue if necessary past the scheduled end time until ten minutes have passed without a bid. The strategic differences in the auction rules are reflected in the auction data by significantly more late bidding on eBay than on Amazon. Futhermore, more experienced bidders on eBay submit late bids more often than do less experienced bidders, while the effect of experience on Amazon goes in the opposite direction. On eBay, there is also more late bidding for antiques than for computers. We also find scale independence in the distribution over time of bidders' last bids, of a form strikingly similar to the deadline effect' noted in bargaining: last bids are distributed according to a power law. The evidence suggests that multiple causes contribute to late bidding, with strategic issues related to the rules about ending the auction playing an important role.
主题	Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Econometrics ; Experimental Design
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w7729
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/565301
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Alvin E. Roth,Axel Ockenfels. Last Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Theory and Evidence from a Natural Experiment on the Internet. 2000.

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文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w7729.pdf（411KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览