| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w7766
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 7766
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| Quality of Bureaucracy and Open-Economy Macro Policies |
| Chong-En Bai; Shang-Jin Wei
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| 发表日期 | 2000-06-01
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| 出版年 | 2000
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | Bureaucratic quality in terms of the level of corruption varies widely across countries, and is in general slow to evolve relative to the speed with which many economic polices can be implemented such as the imposition of capital controls. In this paper, we study the possibility that quality of bureaucracy may be an important structural determinant of open-economy macro-policies, in particular, the imposition/removal of capital controls, and financial repression. We first derive a model that delivers such a result. Bureaucratic corruption translates into reduced ability by the government to collect tax revenue. Even if capital control/financial repression is otherwise inefficient, as long as the government needs the revenue for public goods provision, it would have to rely more on capital control/financial repression. For all countries for which we can obtain relevant data, we find that more corrupt countries are indeed more likely to impose capital controls, a pattern consistent with the model's prediction. The result of this paper suggests that a premature removal of capital controls mandated by outside institutions could reduce rather than enhance economic efficiency. |
| 主题 | International Economics
; International Finance
; International Macroeconomics
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| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w7766
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/565338
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Chong-En Bai,Shang-Jin Wei. Quality of Bureaucracy and Open-Economy Macro Policies. 2000.
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文件名：
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w7766.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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