| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w7815
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 7815
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| The Tenuous Tradeoff Between Risk and Incentives |
| Canice Prendergast
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| 发表日期 | 2000-07-01
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| 出版年 | 2000
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | Empirical work testing for a negative tradeoff between risk and incentives, a cornerstone of agency theory, has not had much success. Indeed, the data seem to suggest a positive relationship between measures of uncertainty and incentives, rather than the posited negative tradeoff. I argue that the existing literature fails to account for an important effect of uncertainty on incentives through the allocation of responsibility to employees. When workers operate in certain settings, the activities that they should engage in are well known, and firms are content to assign tasks to workers and monitor their inputs. By contrast, when the situation is more uncertain, firms know less about how workers should be spending their time. As a result, the delegate responsibility to workers but, to constraint heir discretion, base compensation on observed output. Hence, uncertainty and output-based pay are positively related. I argue that parts of the existing empirical literature are better explained through this lens than with the standard model. |
| 主题 | Labor Economics
; Labor Compensation
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| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w7815
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/565387
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Canice Prendergast. The Tenuous Tradeoff Between Risk and Incentives. 2000.
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文件名：
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w7815.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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