| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w8086 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 8086 |
| Competition, Monopoly, and Aftermarkets | |
| Dennis W. Carlton; Michael Waldman | |
| 发表日期 | 2001 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Consider a durable goods producer that potentially has market power in the aftermarkets associated with its products. An important question is to what extent, if any, should the antitrust laws restrict the firm's behavior in these aftermarkets? In this paper we explore a number of models characterized by either competition or monopoly in the new-unit market, and show that a variety of behaviors that hurt competition in aftermarkets can, in fact, be efficient responses to potential inefficiencies that can arise in aftermarkets. Our results should give courts pause before intervening in aftermarkets. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w8086 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/565679 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Dennis W. Carlton,Michael Waldman. Competition, Monopoly, and Aftermarkets. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w8086.pdf（208KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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