| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w8145 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 8145 |
| Rules, Communication and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case | |
| David Genesove; Wallace P. Mullin | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-03-01 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Detailed notes on weekly meetings of the sugar refining cartel show how communication helps firms collude, and so highlight the deficiencies in the current formal theory of collusion. The Sugar Institute did not fix prices or output. Prices were increased by homogenizing business practices to make price cutting more transparent. Meetings were used to interpret and adapt the agreement, coordinate on jointly profitable actions, ensure unilateral actions were not misconstrued as cheating, and determine whether cheating had occurred. In contrast to established theories, cheating did occur, but sparked only limited retaliation, partly due to the contractual relations with selling agents. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Antitrust |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w8145 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/565741 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | David Genesove,Wallace P. Mullin. Rules, Communication and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w8145.pdf（137KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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