| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w8183 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 8183 |
| Public Versus Secret Reserve Prices in eBay Auctions: Results from a Pokemon Field Experiment | |
| Rama Katkar; David Lucking-Reiley | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-03-01 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Sellers in eBay auctions have the opportunity to choose both a public minimum bid amount and a secret reserve price. We ask, empirically, whether the seller is made better or worse off by setting a secret reserve above a low minimum bid, versus the option of making the reserve public by using it as the minimum bid level. In a field experiment, we auction 50 matched pairs of Pok‚mon cards on eBay, half with secret reserves and half with equivalently high public minimum bids. We find that secret reserve prices make us worse off as sellers, by reducing the probability of the auction resulting in a sale, deterring serious bidders from entering the auction, and lowering the expected transaction price of the auction. We also present evidence that some sellers choose to use secret reserve prices for reasons other than increasing their expected auction prices. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w8183 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/565779 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Rama Katkar,David Lucking-Reiley. Public Versus Secret Reserve Prices in eBay Auctions: Results from a Pokemon Field Experiment. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w8183.pdf（87KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
