| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w8189 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 8189 |
| Expenditure Competition | |
| Roger H. Gordon; John D. Wilson | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-03-01 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Given the temptation on government officials to use some of their budget for 'perks,' residents face the problem of inducing officials to reduce such 'waste.' The threat to vote out of office officials who perform poorly is one possible response. In this paper, we explore the effect that competition for residents induced by fiscal decentralization has on 'waste' in government. We find not only that such competition reduces waste and raises the utility of residents, but also that it should increase the desired level of public expenditures, and to a point above the level that jurisdictions would choose if they could coordinate. These results are in sharp contrast to the presumed effects from such 'tax competition,' and suggest an additional advantage of fiscal decentralization. |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w8189 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/565785 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Roger H. Gordon,John D. Wilson. Expenditure Competition. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w8189.pdf（2444KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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