| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w8201 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 8201 |
| Hospital Governance, Performance Objectives, and Organizational Form | |
| Leslie Eldenburg; Benjamin E. Hermalin; Michael S. Weisbach; Marta Wosinska | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-04-01 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies the governance of a sample of California hospitals. We document a number of empirical relations about hospital governance: The composition of the board of directors varies systematically across ownership types; poor performance and low levels of uncompensated care increase board turnover, with this sensitivity varying by organizational type. Poor performance, high administrative costs, and high uncompensated care lead to higher CEO turnover, with these effects again varying across different organizational types. Overall, these results are consistent with the view that boards of directors of hospitals of different organizational forms are substantially different, and that these boards make decisions to maximize different objective functions. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Industrial Organization ; Nonprofits |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w8201 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/565799 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Leslie Eldenburg,Benjamin E. Hermalin,Michael S. Weisbach,et al. Hospital Governance, Performance Objectives, and Organizational Form. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w8201.pdf（264KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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