全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Employment, Dynamic Deterrence and Crime

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w8281
来源ID	Working Paper 8281
	Employment, Dynamic Deterrence and Crime
	Susumu Imai; Kala Krishna
发表日期	2001-05-01
出版年	2001
语种	英语
摘要	Using monthly panel data we solve and estimate, using maximum likelihood techniques, an explicitly dynamic model of criminal behavior where current criminal activity adversely affects future employment outcomes. This acts as 'dynamic deterrence' to crime: the threat of future adverse effects on employment payoffs when caught committing crimes reduces the incentive to commit them. We show that this dynamic deterrence effect is strong in the data. Hence, policies which weaken dynamic deterrence will be less effective in fighting crime. This suggests that prevention is more powerful than redemption since the latter weakens dynamic deterrence as anticipated future redemption allows criminals to look forward to negating the consequences of their crimes. Static models of criminal behavior neglect this and hence sole reliance on them can result in misleading policy analysis.
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w8281
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/565879
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Susumu Imai,Kala Krishna. Employment, Dynamic Deterrence and Crime. 2001.