| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w8294 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 8294 |
| Empirical Implications of Equilibrium Bidding in First-Price, Symmetric, Common Value Auctions | |
| Kenneth Hendricks; Joris Pinkse; Robert H. Porter | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-05-01 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies federal auctions for wildcat leases on the Outer Continental Shelf from 1954 to 1970. These are leases where bidders privately acquire (at some cost) noisy, but equally informative, signals about the amount of oil and gas that may be present. We develop a test of equilibrium bidding in a common values model that is implemented using data on bids and ex post values. We compute bid markups and rents under the alternative hypotheses of private and common values and find that the data are more consistent with the latter hypothesis. Finally, we use data on tract location and ex post values to test the comparative static prediction in common value auctions that bidders may bid less aggressively when they expect more competition. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Market Structure and Distribution |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w8294 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/565892 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kenneth Hendricks,Joris Pinkse,Robert H. Porter. Empirical Implications of Equilibrium Bidding in First-Price, Symmetric, Common Value Auctions. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w8294.pdf（450KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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