| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w8347 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 8347 |
| Multi-Issue Bargaining and Linked Agendas: Ricardo Revisited or No Pain No Gain | |
| Ignatius J. Horstmann; James R. Markusen; Jack Robles | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-06-01 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | There has been much discussion about what issues should be included in international 'trade' negotiations. Different countries, firms and activists groups have quite different views regarding which items should (or should not) be negotiated together. Proposals run the gamut from no linking to linking trade with investment, the environment, labor and human-rights codes. This paper provides a formal framework for analyzing these questions. It employs a two-country, two-issue bargaining model and contrasts outcomes when issues are negotiated separately and when they are linked in some form. A key concept is 'comparative interest', analogous to Ricardian comparative advantage. We provide general results and note, in particular, where a country can benefit by agreeing to include an agenda item for which, when viewed by itself, the country does not receive a positive payoff. |
| 主题 | International Economics ; International Factor Mobility ; Trade |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w8347 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/565945 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ignatius J. Horstmann,James R. Markusen,Jack Robles. Multi-Issue Bargaining and Linked Agendas: Ricardo Revisited or No Pain No Gain. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w8347.pdf（349KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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