| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w8371 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 8371 |
| Political Market Structure | |
| James E. Anderson; Thomas J. Prusa | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-07-01 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Many political markets are essentially uncontested, in the sense that one candidate raises little (or no) money and consequently has little chance of election. This presents a puzzle in the presence of apparently low barriers to entry. Using a variant of Baron (1989) we provide a theory encompassing both contested and uncontested markets. The essential addition is the presence of fixed costs of campaigning. We show that these may be quite small and yet constitute decisive barriers to entry. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w8371 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/565973 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | James E. Anderson,Thomas J. Prusa. Political Market Structure. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w8371.pdf（267KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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