| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w8376 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 8376 |
| Favoritism Under Social Pressure | |
| Luis Garicano; Ignacio Palacios; Canice Prendergast | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-07-01 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper provides empirical evidence of favoritism by agents, where that favoritism is generated by social pressure. To do so, we explore the behavior of professional soccer referees. Referees have discretion over the addition of extra time at the end of a soccer game (called injury time), to compensate for lost time due to unusual stoppages. We test for systematic bias shown by Spanish referees in favor of home teams. We show that referees systematically favor home teams by shortening close games where the home team is ahead, and lengthening close games where the home team is behind. They show no such bias for games that are not close. We further show that when the rewards for winning games increase, referees change their bias accordingly. We also identify that the mechanism through which bias operates is the referees' desire to satisfy the crowd, by documenting how the size and composition of the crowd affect referee favoritism. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w8376 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/565978 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Luis Garicano,Ignacio Palacios,Canice Prendergast. Favoritism Under Social Pressure. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w8376.pdf（3402KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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