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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w8449 |
来源ID | Working Paper 8449 |
Corporate Governance and Equity Prices | |
Paul A. Gompers; Joy L. Ishii; Andrew Metrick | |
发表日期 | 2001-08-01 |
出版年 | 2001 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | Corporate-governance provisions related to takeover defenses and shareholder rights vary substantially across firms. In this paper, we use the incidence of 24 different provisions to build a 'Governance Index' for about 1,500 firms per year, and then we study the relationship between this index and several forward-looking performance measures during the 1990s. We find a striking relationship between corporate governance and stock returns. An investment strategy that bought the firms in the lowest decile of the index (strongest shareholder rights) and sold the firms in the highest decile of the index (weakest shareholder rights) would have earned abnormal returns of 8.5 percent per year during the sample period. Furthermore, the Governance Index is highly correlated with firm value. In 1990, a one-point increase in the index is associated with a 2.4 percentage-point lower value for Tobin's Q. By 1999, this difference had increased significantly, with a one-point increase in the index associated with an 8.9 percentage-point lower value for Tobin's Q. Finally, we find that weaker shareholder rights are associated with lower profits, lower sales growth, higher capital expenditures, and a higher amount of corporate acquisitions. We conclude with a discussion of several causal interpretations. |
主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w8449 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/566052 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Paul A. Gompers,Joy L. Ishii,Andrew Metrick. Corporate Governance and Equity Prices. 2001. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w8449.pdf(371KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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