| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w8452 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 8452 |
| The Effect of Capital Structure When Expected Agency Costs are Extreme | |
| Campbell R. Harvey; Karl V. Lins; Andrew H. Roper | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-09-01 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We provide new evidence that debt creates shareholder value for firms that face agency costs. Our tests are unique in two respects. First, we focus on a sample of firms with potentially extreme agency problems. We study emerging market firms where the routine use of pyramid ownership structures provides an acute separation of management cash flow rights and control rights. Second, we argue that not all debt is the same. Using new data on global debt issuance, we find that the type of debt that positively impacts shareholder value is the type that closely monitors management. This combination of a sample of firms with extreme expected agency problems and detailed information on the different types of debt allows us to construct powerful tests of whether debt can mitigate the effects of agency and information problems. Among other results, we find that the abnormal returns resulting from syndicated term loans (which provide monitoring) are significantly related to the extent of the separation of ownership and control. Our results are consistent with the idea that debt creates value because it reduces the agency costs associated with overinvestment. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w8452 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/566056 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Campbell R. Harvey,Karl V. Lins,Andrew H. Roper. The Effect of Capital Structure When Expected Agency Costs are Extreme. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w8452.pdf（157KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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