全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Cronyism and Capital Controls: Evidence from Malaysia

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w8521
来源ID	Working Paper 8521
	Cronyism and Capital Controls: Evidence from Malaysia
	Simon Johnson; Todd Mitton
发表日期	2001-10-01
出版年	2001
语种	英语
摘要	The initial impact of the Asian financial crisis in Malaysia reduced the expected value of government subsidies to politically favored firms. Of the estimated $60 billion loss in market value for politically connected firms from July 1997 to August 1998, roughly 9% can be attributed to the fall in the value of their connections. Firing the Deputy Prime Minister and imposing capital controls in September 1998 primarily benefited firms with strong ties to Prime Minister Mahathir. Of the estimated $5 billion gain in market value for Mahathir-connected firms during September 1998, approximately 32% was due to the increase in the value of their connections. The evidence suggests Malaysian capital controls provided a screen behind which favored firms could be supported.
主题	Macroeconomics ; Financial Economics
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w8521
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/566125
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Simon Johnson,Todd Mitton. Cronyism and Capital Controls: Evidence from Malaysia. 2001.