| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w8522 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 8522 |
| Incentives in HMOs | |
| Martin Gaynor; James B. Rebitzer; Lowell J. Taylor | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-10-01 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the effect of physician incentives in an HMO network. Physician incentives are controversial because they may induce doctors to make treatment decisions that differ from those they would chose in the absence of incentives. We set out a theoretical framework for assessing the degree to which incentive contracts do in fact induce physicians to deviate from a standard guided only by patient interests and professional medical judgement. Our empirical evaluation of the model relies on details of the HMO's incentive contracts and access to the firm's internal expenditure records. We estimate that the HMO's incentive contract provides a typical physician an increase, at the margin, of $0.10 in income for each $1.00 reduction in medical utilization expenditures. The average response is a 5 percent reduction in medical expenditures. We also find suggestive evidence that financial incentives linked to commonly used quality measures may stimulate an improvement in measured quality. |
| 主题 | Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w8522 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/566126 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Martin Gaynor,James B. Rebitzer,Lowell J. Taylor. Incentives in HMOs. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w8522.pdf（737KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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