| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w8591 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 8591 |
| Labor Market Search and Optimal Retirement Policy | |
| Joydeep Bhattacharya; Casey B. Mulligan; Robert R. Reed III | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-11-01 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A popular view about social security, dating back to its early days of inception, is that it is a means for young, unemployed workers to 'purchase' jobs from older, employed workers. The question we ask is: Can social security, by encouraging retirement and hence creating job vacancies for the young, improve the allocation of workers to jobs in the labor market? Using a standard model of labor market search, we establish that the equilibrium with no policy-induced retirement can be efficient. Even under worst-case parameterizations of our model, we find that public retirement programs pay the elderly substantially more than labor market search theory implies that their jobs are worth. An important effect, ignored by the popular view, is that the creation of a vacant job by a retirement reduces the value of other vacant jobs. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Taxation ; Labor Economics ; Unemployment and Immigration |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w8591 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/566197 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Joydeep Bhattacharya,Casey B. Mulligan,Robert R. Reed III. Labor Market Search and Optimal Retirement Policy. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w8591.pdf（271KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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