| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w8626 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 8626 |
| Estimation of a Dynamic Auction Game | |
| Mireia Jofre-Bonet; Martin Pesendorfer | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-12-01 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper proposes an estimation method for a repeated auction game under the presence of capacity contraints. The estimation strategy is computationally simple as it does not require solving for the equilibrium of the game. It uses a two stage approach. In the first stage the distribution of bids conditional on state variables is estimated using data on bids, bidder characteristics and contract characteristics. In the second stage, an expression of the expected sum of future profits based on the distribution of bids is obtained, and costs are inferred based on the first order condition of optimal bids. We apply the estimation method to repeated highway construction procurement auctions in the state of California between May 1996 and May 1999. In this market, previously won uncompleted contracts reduce the probability of winning further contracts. We quantify the effect of intertemporal constraints on bidders' costs and on bids. Due to the intertemporal effect and also to bidder asymmetry, the auction can be inefficient. Based on the estimates of costs, we quantify efficiency losses. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Economics of Information |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w8626 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/566232 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Mireia Jofre-Bonet,Martin Pesendorfer. Estimation of a Dynamic Auction Game. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w8626.pdf（401KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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