| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w8642 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 8642 |
| Efficiency in Marriage | |
| Shelly Lundberg; Robert A. Pollak | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-12-13 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Economists usually assume that bargaining in marriage leads to efficient outcomes. The most convincing rationale for this assumption is the belief that efficient allocations are likely to emerge from repeated interactions in stationary environments, and that marriage provides such an environment. This paper argues that when a current decision affects future bargaining power, inefficient outcomes are plausible. If the spouses could make binding commitments -- in effect, commitments to refrain from exploiting the future bargaining advantage -- then the inefficiency would disappear. But spouses seldom can make binding commitments regarding allocation within marriage. To investigate the efficiency of bargaining within marriage when choices affect future bargaining power, we consider the location decisions of two-earner couples. These location decisions are transparent and analytically tractable examples of choices likely to affect future bargaining power, but the logic of our analysis applies to many other decisions. For example, decisions about education, fertility, and labor force participation are also potential sources of inefficiency. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w8642 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/566249 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Shelly Lundberg,Robert A. Pollak. Efficiency in Marriage. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w8642.pdf（115KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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