| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w8656 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 8656 |
| Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights | |
| Jean Olson Lanjouw; Mark Schankerman | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-12-13 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the determinants of patent suits and their outcomes over the period 1978-1999 by linking detailed information from the U.S. patent office, the federal court system, and industry sources. The probability of being involved in a suit is very heterogeneous, being much higher for valuable patents and for patents owned by individuals and smaller firms. Thus the patent system generates incentives, net of expected enforcement costs, that differ across inventors. Patentees with a large portfolio of patents to trade, or having other characteristics that encourage 'cooperative' interaction with disputants, more successfully avoid court actions. At the same time, key post-suit outcomes do not depend on observed characteristics. This is good news: advantages in settlement are exercised quickly, before extensive legal proceedings consume both court and firm resources. But it is bad news in that the more frequent involvement of smaller patentees in court actions is not offset by a more rapid resolution of their suits. However, our estimates of the heterogeneity in litigation risk can facilitate development of private patent litigation insurance to mitigate this adverse affect of high enforcement costs. |
| 主题 | Other ; Law and Economics ; Development and Growth ; Innovation and R& ; D |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w8656 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/566263 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jean Olson Lanjouw,Mark Schankerman. Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w8656.pdf（346KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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