| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w8664 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 8664 |
| Selection and Oversight in the Public Sector, With the Los Angeles Police Department as an Example | |
| Canice Prendergast | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-12-13 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | I offer theoretical and empirical observations on the oversight of public sector employees. I argue that it is unreasonable to expect that the solutions typically considered in the literature will be effective with public sector employees, because bureaucrats are especially difficult to monitor. To offset this weakness, agencies tend to hire bureaucrats who are biased against consumers, where such bias increases incentives. I then address how bureaucrats should be overseen and offer a choice between internal monitoring of public agencies, with overseers who are biased against consumers, or external monitoring, where bureaucrats become excessively worried about the prospect of an investigation and may change their behavior to attain that goal. I provide evidence from the Los Angeles Police Department to show that officers appear to have responded to increased oversight by reducing crime-fighting activities in an attempt to avoid investigation. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Nonprofits |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w8664 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/566271 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Canice Prendergast. Selection and Oversight in the Public Sector, With the Los Angeles Police Department as an Example. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w8664.pdf（351KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
| 个性服务 |
| 推荐该条目 |
| 保存到收藏夹 |
| 导出为Endnote文件 |
| 谷歌学术 |
| 谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
| [Canice Prendergast]的文章 |
| 百度学术 |
| 百度学术中相似的文章 |
| [Canice Prendergast]的文章 |
| 必应学术 |
| 必应学术中相似的文章 |
| [Canice Prendergast]的文章 |
| 相关权益政策 |
| 暂无数据 |
| 收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
