| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w8680 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 8680 |
| Corporate Governance and the Home Bias | |
| Lee Pinkowitz; Rene M. Stulz; Rohan Williamson | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-12-20 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In most countries, many of the largest corporations are controlled by large shareholders. We show that, under reasonable assumptions, this stylized fact implies that portfolio holdings of U.S. investors should exhibit a home bias in equilibrium. We construct an estimate of the world portfolio of shares available to investors who are not controlling shareholders. This available world portfolio differs sharply from the world market portfolio. In regressions explaining the portfolio weights of U.S. investors, the world portfolio of available shares has a positive significant coefficient but the world market portfolio has no additional explanatory power. This result holds when we control for country characteristics. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Portfolio Selection and Asset Pricing |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w8680 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/566287 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Lee Pinkowitz,Rene M. Stulz,Rohan Williamson. Corporate Governance and the Home Bias. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w8680.pdf（224KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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