| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w8756 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 8756 |
| Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying: Why Governments Pick Losers | |
| Richard E. Baldwin; Frederic Robert-Nicoud | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-01-31 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Governments frequently intervene to support domestic industries, but a surprising amount of this support goes to ailing sectors. We explain this with a lobbying model that allows for entry and sunk costs. Specifically, policy is influenced by pressure groups that incur lobbying expenses to create rents. In expanding industry, entry tends to erode such rents, but in declining industries, sunk costs rule out entry as long as the rents are not too high. This asymmetric appropriablity of rents means losers lobby harder. Thus it is not that government policy picks losers, it is that losers pick government policy. |
| 主题 | International Economics ; Trade ; Industrial Organization ; Regulatory Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w8756 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/566363 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Richard E. Baldwin,Frederic Robert-Nicoud. Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying: Why Governments Pick Losers. 2002. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w8756.pdf（318KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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