| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w8763 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 8763 |
| Measuring Investment Distortions when Risk-Averse Managers Decide Whether to Undertake Risky Projects | |
| Robert Parrino; Allen M. Poteshman; Michael S. Weisbach | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-01-31 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper examines distortions in corporate investment decisions when a new project changes firm risk. It presents a dynamic model in which a self-interested, risk-averse manager makes investment decisions at a levered firm. The model, calibrated using data from public firms, is used to estimate the magnitude of distortions in investment decisions. Despite potential wealth transfers from debtholders, managers compensated with equity prefer safe projects to risky ones. Important factors in this decision are the expected changes in the values of future tax shields and bankruptcy costs when firm risk changes. We also evaluate the extent to which this effect varies with firm leverage, managerial risk aversion, managerial non-firm wealth, project size, debt duration, and the structure of management compensation packages. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Public Economics ; Taxation |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w8763 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/566370 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Robert Parrino,Allen M. Poteshman,Michael S. Weisbach. Measuring Investment Distortions when Risk-Averse Managers Decide Whether to Undertake Risky Projects. 2002. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w8763.pdf（351KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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