| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w8803 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 8803 |
| Highway Franchising and Real Estate Values | |
| Eduardo Engel; Ronald Fischer; Alexander Galetovic | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-02-21 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | It has become increasingly common to allocate highway franchises to the bidder that offers to charge the lowest toll. Often, building a highway increases the value of land held by a small group of developers, an effect that is more pronounced with lower tolls. We study the welfare implications of highway franchises that benefit large developers, focusing on the incentives developers have to internalize the effect of the toll they bid on the value of their land. We study how participation by developers in the auction affects equilibrium tolls and welfare. We find that large developers bid more aggressively than construction companies that own no land. As long as land ownership is sufficiently concentrated, allowing developers in the auction leads to lower tolls and higher welfare. Moreover, collusion among developers is socially desirable. We also analyze the case when the franchise holder can charge lower tolls to those buying her land (`toll discrimination'). Relative to uniform tolls, discrimination decreases welfare when land is highly concentrated, but increases welfare otherwise. Finally, we consider the welfare implications of subsidies and bonuses for proposing new highway projects. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Public Economics ; Public Goods |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w8803 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/566410 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Eduardo Engel,Ronald Fischer,Alexander Galetovic. Highway Franchising and Real Estate Values. 2002. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w8803.pdf（172KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
