| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w8811 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 8811 |
| Monitoring, Motivation and Management: The Determinants of Opportunistic Behavior in a Field Experiment | |
| Daniel Nagin; James Rebitzer; Seth Sanders; Lowell Taylor | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-02-28 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Economic models of incentives in employment relationships are based on a specific theory of motivation. Employees are 'rational cheaters,' who anticipate the consequences of their actions and shirk when the perceived marginal benefit exceeds the marginal cost. Managers respond to this decision calculus by implementing monitoring and incentive pay practices that lessen the attraction of shirking. This 'rational cheater model' is not the only model of opportunistic behavior, and indeed is viewed skeptically by human resource practitioners and by many non-economists who study employment relationships. We investigate the 'rational cheater model' using data from a double-blind field experiment that allows us to observe the effect of experimentally-induced variations in monitoring on employee opportunism. The experiment is unique in that it occurs in the context of an ongoing employment relationship, i.e., with the firm's employees producing output as usual under the supervision of their front-line managers. The results indicate that a significant fraction of employees behave roughly in ccordance with the 'rational cheater model.' We also find, however, that a substantial proportion of employees do not respond to manipulations in the monitoring rate. This heterogeneity is related to employee assessments about their general treatment by the emp loyer. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w8811 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/566418 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Daniel Nagin,James Rebitzer,Seth Sanders,et al. Monitoring, Motivation and Management: The Determinants of Opportunistic Behavior in a Field Experiment. 2002. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w8811.pdf（1016KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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