| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w8859 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 8859 |
| Contracting in the Absence of Specific Investments and Moral Hazard: Understanding Carrier-Driver Relations in U.S. Trucking | |
| Francine Lafontaine; Scott E. Masten | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-03-28 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper considers functions of contracting other than the protection of relationship-specific investments and the provision of marginal incentives, and applies the theory to explain variation in the form of compensation of over-the-road truck drivers in the U.S. Specifically, we argue that contracts in this industry serve to economize on the costs of price determination for heterogeneous transactions. We show that the actual terms of those contracts vary systematically with the nature of hauls in a way that is consistent with the theory. By contrast, we find that vehicle ownership, which defines a driver's status as an owner operator or company driver, depends on driver, but not trailer or haul, characteristics. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Firm Behavior ; Microeconomics ; Households and Firms |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w8859 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/566466 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Francine Lafontaine,Scott E. Masten. Contracting in the Absence of Specific Investments and Moral Hazard: Understanding Carrier-Driver Relations in U.S. Trucking. 2002. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w8859.pdf（218KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
