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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w8865 |
来源ID | Working Paper 8865 |
The Costs of Price Stability - Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity in Europe | |
Steinar Holden | |
发表日期 | 2002-03-28 |
出版年 | 2002 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | In most European countries, the prevailing terms of employment, including the nominal wage, can only be changed by mutual consent. I show that this feature implies that workers have a strategic advantage in the wage negotiations when they try to prevent a cut in nominal wages. If inflation is so low that some nominal wages have to be cut, the strategic advantage of the workers' induces higher unemployment in equilibrium. The upshot is a long run tradeoff between inflation and unemployment for low levels of inflation. The prediction that low inflation involves higher unemployment in Europe but not in the US, is consistent with previous empirical findings. |
主题 | Labor Economics ; Labor Relations ; Unemployment and Immigration |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w8865 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/566472 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Steinar Holden. The Costs of Price Stability - Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity in Europe. 2002. |
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w8865.pdf(406KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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