| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w8868 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 8868 |
| The Role of Residual Claims and Self-Enforcement in Franchise Contracting | |
| Francine Lafontaine; Emmanuel Raynaud | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-03-28 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Much of the economic literature on franchising has been concerned with incentive issues and how these are managed in franchised contracts. Two main types of incentive mechanisms have been identified: residual claims and self enforcement. In this paper we describe these incentive mechanisms, and their use in franchise contracts. We argue that although these two types of mechanisms are usually thought of as alternative ways to align franchisee and franchisor incentives, they are in fact complementary in franchise contracts because they address different incentive problems. We explore what these incentive problems are, and then describe specifically how franchise contract terms and practices support each type of incentive mechanism. Finally, we discuss briefly, via two examples, how our analysis also applies to non-franchised systems with common marks or other reputation concerns. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Firm Behavior ; Microeconomics ; Households and Firms |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w8868 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/566475 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Francine Lafontaine,Emmanuel Raynaud. The Role of Residual Claims and Self-Enforcement in Franchise Contracting. 2002. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w8868.pdf（202KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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