| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w8869 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 8869 |
| Competition in or for the Field: Which is Better? | |
| Eduardo Engel; Ronald Fischer; Alexander Galetovic | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-04-04 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In many circumstances, a principal, who wants prices to be as low as possible, must contract with agents who would like to charge the monopoly price. This paper compares a Demsetz auction, which awards an exclusive contract to the agent bidding the lowest price (competition for the field) with having two agents provide the good under (imperfectly) competitive conditions (competition in the field). We obtain a simple sufficient condition showing unambiguously which option is best. The condition depends only on the shapes of the surplus function of the principal and the profit function of agents, and is independent of the particular duopoly game played ex post. We apply this condition to three canonical examples -- procurement, royalty contracts and dealerships -- and find that whenever marginal revenue for the final good is decreasing in the quantity sold, a Demsetz auction is best. Moreover, a planner who wants to maximize social surplus also prefers a Demsetz auction. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w8869 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/566476 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Eduardo Engel,Ronald Fischer,Alexander Galetovic. Competition in or for the Field: Which is Better?. 2002. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w8869.pdf（151KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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