| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w8958 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 8958 |
| Social Security and Democracy | |
| Casey B. Mulligan; Ricard Gil; Xavier Sala-i-Martin | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-05-23 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Many political economic theories use and emphasize the process of voting in their explanation of the growth of Social Security, government spending, and other public policies. But is there an empirical connection between democracy and Social Security program size or design? Using some new international data sets to produce both country-panel econometric estimates as well as case studies of South American and southern European countries, we find that Social Security policy varies according to economic and demographic factors, but that very different political histories can result in the same Social Security policy. We find little partial effect of democracy on the size of Social Security budgets, on how those budgets are allocated, or how economic and demographic factors affect Social Security. If there is any observed difference, democracies spend a little less of their GDP on Social Security, grow their budgets a bit more slowly, and cap their payroll tax more often, than do economically and demographically similar nondemocracies. Democracies and nondemocracies are equally likely to have benefit formulas inducing retirement and, conditional on GDP per capita, equally likely to induce retirement with a retirement test vs. an earnings test. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w8958 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/566566 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Casey B. Mulligan,Ricard Gil,Xavier Sala-i-Martin. Social Security and Democracy. 2002. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w8958.pdf（419KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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