| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w8973 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 8973 |
| Democratic Policy Making with Real-Time Agenda Setting: Part 1 | |
| B. Douglas Bernheim; Antonio Rangel; Luis Rayo | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-05-30 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We examine democratic policy-making in a simple institution with real-time agenda setting. Individuals are recognized sequentially. Once recognized, an individual makes a proposal, which is immediately put to a vote. If a proposal passes, it supercedes all previously passed proposals. The policy that emerges from this process is implemented. For some familiar classes of policy spaces with rich distributional politics, we show that the last proposer is effectively a dictator under a variety of natural conditions. Most notably, this occurs whenever a sufficient number of individuals have opportunities to make proposals. Thus, under reasonably general assumptions, control of the final proposal with real-time agenda setting confers as much power as control of the entire agenda. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Public Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w8973 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/566581 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | B. Douglas Bernheim,Antonio Rangel,Luis Rayo. Democratic Policy Making with Real-Time Agenda Setting: Part 1. 2002. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w8973.pdf（546KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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